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Choice-induced preference: A challenge for contrast 
Commentary on Zentall on Cognitive Dissonance 
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Abstract:  In his target article, Zentall asks: “to experience cognitive dissonance is it necessary for 
one to have conflicting beliefs or even beliefs at all?” He then argues that a simple behavioral 
process, the Within Trial Contrast Effect, may be sufficient to explain observed cognitive 
dissonance effects in nonhuman animals and possibly humans as well. We agree with Zentall that 
this effect is sufficient to explain many reported cognitive dissonance effects in nonhuman 
animals, but question its sufficiency for primate behavior (both monkeys and humans).  
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Cognitive dissonance in animals is generally studied using one of three approaches: (1) 
justification of effort, (2) induced compliance, and (3) choice-induced preference (Harmon-Jones 
& Harmon-Jones, 2008). We agree with Zentall that a Within Trial Contrast mechanism can 
explain findings from the justification of effort and induced compliance paradigms. However, we 
believe that the Within Trial Contrast Effect (WTCE) may not suffice to explain choice-induced 
preference.  
Choice-induced preference refers to a phenomenon where the act of choosing between 
equivalent items produces a subsequent decrease in preference for the rejected item (Izuma & 
Muramya, 2013; Zentall, 2016). Similar to the justification of effort and induced compliance 
paradigms, choice-induced preference is thought to reflect a dissonance resolution process that 
involves a post-choice reevaluation of beliefs and actions driven by a drive for consistency 
(Sharot et al., 2010). Some authors have raised methodological concerns about the means used 
to measure choice-induced preference (Chen, 2008; Chen & Risen, 2010). Nonetheless, a variety 
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of follow-ups with new controls have since validated the general effect (Egan et al., 2010; 
Johansson et al., 2013; Coppin et al., 2014; Lou & Yu, 2016).  
In Zentall’s explanation, the WTCE occurs when stimuli are reinforced after an aversive 
event that produces a greater reward contrast, and thus greater perceived value for the 
stimulus. The more aversive the event, the greater the contrast and by extension the greater the 
perceived value for the stimulus. As Meindl (2012) notes, WTCEs function as a type of 
motivating operation by which an antecedent event can alter the efficacy of a proceeding 
stimulus as a reinforcer.  
 The problem with the WTCE as an explanation for choice-induced preference is that 
there is no aversive event that occurs within a typical study of choice-induced preference. One 
could argue that the act of choosing functions as the aversive event and that the subsequent 
choice ends it. However, if this were the case, only the chosen item should undergo a change in 
preference or value as it is the stimulus that follows the aversive event of choosing. Yet, 
experimental tests of choice-induced preference show changes in valuation of the rejected 
stimulus (Izuma & Murymama, 2013). Thus, choice-induced preference is difficult to explain 
using WTC. Instead, a belief-based drive for consistency appears to be the most parsimonious 
explanation (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2008).  
Furthermore, we question the sufficiency of WTCEs in choice-induced preference due to 
the lack of evidence in animals outside the primate order. If choice-induced preference were to 
arise out of simple behavioral processes, one would expect it to be ubiquitous in nonhuman 
animals similar to research on justification of effort in rats, pigeons, and humans (Lydall, 2010; 
Zentall, 2016). However, animal evidence has instead highlighted the uniqueness of choice-
induced preference within humans and monkeys. 
Only three studies have demonstrated choice-induced preferences in nonhuman animals 
(Eagan et al., 2007, 2010; West et al., 2010). In a study of capuchin monkeys, Eagan et al. (2007, 
2010) demonstrated choice-induced preference effects that replicated across control 
conditions. Using a phylogenetic approach, West et al. (2010) examined choice-induced 
preferences across four taxonomic groups (bears, parrots, monkeys, and apes). Like Eagan et al. 
(2007), West et al. found choice-induced preferences in monkeys but not the other groups.  
We find the exclusivity of choice-induced preferences to studies examining humans and 
monkeys interesting, as it addresses Zentall’s closing call for procedures to differentiate more 
cognitive from behavioral accounts of cognitive dissonance in order to better understand animal 
minds. On one hand, the finding of choice-induced preferences in monkeys may indicate a 
cognitive process shared with humans beyond simple behavioral processes. If so, then it 
provides evidence that monkeys are capable of maintaining beliefs and experiencing conflict 
between them. However, the surprising failure to detect choice-induced preference in apes by 
West et al. (2010) casts doubt on this interpretation and raises questions as to whether the way 
apes and monkeys experience dissonance is similar to the way humans do. Answering this 
question will require careful consideration of the social and behavioral factors that influence 
choice-induced preferences.  
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